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Trade Policy and Performance in Sub-Saharan 









This  paper  reviews  trade  policy  reform  and  performance  in  Africa  since  the  1980s. 
African  countries  have  implemented  significant  trade  liberalisation  in  this  period,  in 
particular reducing tariffs. This has usually resulted in an increase in imports, but export 
growth has often been sluggish so that in many countries the trade deficit has increased. 
The  paper  documents  trends  and  performance  and  reviews  the  explanations  for  poor 
export response. While trade policy reform has been beneficial, the impact has not been 
as great as expected and the core challenge facing African countries is how to diversify 




Cet  article  examine  la  réforme  des  politiques  commerciales  et  les  performances 
commerciales en Afrique depuis les années 1980. Les pays africains ont mis en oeuvre 
d'importantes mesures de libéralisation des échanges pendant cette période, et notamment 
réduit  les  tarifs  douaniers.  Il  s'en  est  généralement  suivi  une  augmentation  des 
importations, mais la croissance des exportations a souvent été faible, de sorte que dans 
de nombreux pays le déficit commercial s'est creusé. L'article expose les performances et 
les tendances observées et passe en revue les raisons qui expliquent cette faible réponse 
des exportations. S'il est vrai que les réformes stratégiques ont été bénéfiques, leur impact 
n'a pas été à hauteur des attentes et le grand défi pour les pays africains aujourd'hui est de 
diversifier et d'accroître leurs exportations. 
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Section 1: Introduction 
 
The majority of African countries have liberalised their trade regimes during the past two 
decades.  Some  countries  began  this  process  in  the  early  1980s,  but  most  have  only 
implemented  sustained  and  significant  reduction  in  barriers  to  imports  since  the  late 
1980s or early 1990s. The major trade liberalisation reforms in almost all countries were 
unilateral, reforms made by the country acting alone, rather than being implemented as 
part of an agreement with trading partners. However, various agreements with trading 
partners have ‘locked in’ the reform efforts. Most obviously, the multilateral negotiations 
during the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that 
culminated  in  the  establishment  of  the  World  Trade  Organization  (WTO)  in  1995 
resulted in African countries making commitments to open trade policies and declaring 
their bound tariffs (typically at levels above applied tariffs). Numerous regional trading 
agreements, some of more substance than others, exist whereby African countries have 
agreed  to  more  open  trade  with  other  African  countries.  There  are  also  special 
agreements  relating  to  trade  between  groups  of  African  countries  and  developed 
countries, especially the European Union (EU) (notably arrangements with the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States) and the United States (US) (notably the 
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)). Trade and openness are now high on the 
policy agenda in African countries. 
 
This paper concentrates on the experience with trade reforms in Africa since the 1980s 
and  African  trade  performance  in  the  1990s.  Although  the  focus  is  on  sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA), some results are reported for all of Africa (allowing comparison between 
North Africa and SSA). The major reforms implemented were import liberalisation, and 
it is these reforms that may have affected economic performance over the past decade. 
We  address  two  specific  questions:  what  trade  reforms  have  African  countries 
implemented during the past two decades and have there been identifiable economic 
effects? 
 
The direct impact of trade liberalisation should be to increase the exposure of economies 
to international trade (a common definition of openness), which would be reflected in an 
increase in the volume of trade. The expectation is that increased trade encourages a 
more efficient use of resources, increases competitiveness and contributes to economic 
growth. However, trade reform is likely to have a more direct and immediate effect on 
imports than on exports. Factors external to an individual country, such as world prices, 
are typically more important determinants of the volume and value of exports than a 
country’s own trade policies. Furthermore, the ability of a country to increase exports (its 
export supply response) is constrained by structural rigidities in production capacity, and 
infrastructure and institutional barriers to trade (trade costs). This is especially true in 
SSA, where exports are predominantly of primary commodities subject to world prices 
and demand determined elsewhere and, in the case of agriculture, affected by weather 
and other natural phenomena. There are therefore a variety of reasons why the beneficial 
effects of increased openness to trade may be slow to materialise for African countries, 
and these are explored in the paper. 
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We begin in Section 2 with a brief overview of trends in Africa’s performance in relation 
to global trade developments in the 1990s. Section 3 considers the arguments for trade 
reform  and  discusses  some  measurement  issues.  Section  4  reviews  the  trade 
liberalisation achievements in Africa, which have generally been more considerable than 
is often recognised. Section 5 relates reforms to trade performance, covering imports, 
exports and the combined impact on the balance of trade. In general, export growth has 
been at best sluggish, and the reasons for this are considered. We conclude in Section 6 
with a discussion of implications for future trade policy. 
 
Section 2: Africa’s Trade Performance in a Global Perspective 
 
Compared to other regions, Africa, and especially SSA, has exhibited poor economic 
performance  over  at  least  the  past  two  decades.  While  some  countries  have  been 
exceptions to the trend and performed very well, the regional performance is cause for 
concern. The dollar value (in current terms) of exports from Africa actually declined in 
the  1980s  and  rose  by  only  three  percent  in  the  1990s.  Africa’s  share  of  world 
merchandise  trade  declined  between  1990  and  2000,  in  terms  of  both  exports  and 
imports (Table 1). It is clear that Africa has not shared in the growth of world trade. 
 
 
Table 1: Regional Shares of World Merchandise Trade, 1990 and 2000 
   
Region  Exports (%)  Imports (%) 
  1990  2000  1990  2000 
North America  15.4  17.1  18.4  23.2 
Western Europe  48.3  39.5  48.7  39.6 
Asia  21.8  26.7  20.3  22.8 
Latin America  4.3  5.8  3.7  6.0 
Africa  3.1  2.3  2.7  2.1 
Source: WTO (2001). 
 
The Africa region accounted for just over three percent of world merchandise exports in 
1990, but this had declined to a 2.3 percentage share in 2000. Over the same period, 
Africa’s share of world merchandise imports also declined. Annual variability in the 
value of exports was very pronounced in the late 1990s, declining by 17 percent in 1998 
but rising by 27 percent in 2000, for example (WTO, 2001: 77). The value of imports, in 
contrast, has been quite stable – negligible change throughout the 1980s, and a four 
percent increase in the 1990s (WTO, 2001: 77).  
 
This variability in exports, as compared with imports, can also be seen in the sector 
composition  of  trade.  Africa’s  exports  are  principally  of  minerals  (mining  and 
petroleum). Sector shares of export earnings are determined more by trends in world 
prices than changes in export volumes. In the early 2000s, the value of mineral exports 
declined  slightly  while  the  value  of  agriculture  commodities  increased  slightly,  with 
manufactures remaining quite stable (Table 2). Africa’s imports are predominantly of 




Table 2: Composition of Regional Exports (Sector % Share in Regional Total) 
   
Region  Agriculture  Minerals  Manufactures 
  2000  2002  2000  2002  2000  2002 
North America  10  10.7  7.2  7.2  78  76.9 
Western Europe  9.4  9.4  7.1  6.9  80.3  80.7 
Asia  6.5  6.6  7  7.1  84.2  83.6 
Latin America  18.4  19.3  20.5  20.3  60.5  59.5 
Africa  12.9  15.8  59.7  55  24.6  25.2 
Source: WTO (2001; 2003). 
 
 
Table 3: Composition of Regional Imports (Sector % Share in Regional Total) 
 
Region  Agriculture  Minerals  Manufactures 
  1999  2002  1999  2002  1999  2002 
North America  6.3  6.2  9  11.2  80.5  78.5 
Western Europe  11  10.2  8.2  10.7  77.2  75.7 
Asia  10.6  9.5  14.5  16.9  72.5  71.1 
Latin America  9.6  9.8  9.1  10.9  78  76.3 
Africa  16.6  15.9  10.1  10.8  70.2  70.9 
Source: WTO (2001; 2003). 
 
Primary  commodities  dominate  African  exports.  While  the  export  prices  of  primary 
commodities overall held their value in the 1990s, this was driven largely by increased 
world prices for timber and crude petroleum. World prices for many products important 
to Africa declined between 1990 and 2000: cocoa by 29 percent, sugar by 26 percent, 
coffee  by  9  percent,  cotton  by  28  percent  and  copper  by  32  percent,  while  minerals 
overall declined by 14 percent (WTO, 2001: 212). One of the principal factors accounting 
for the decline in the value of SSA exports is that the world prices of many of the primary 
commodities they export have declined (Table 4). For example, between 1995 and 2002, 
prices of cotton, sugar and copper lost almost half of their value while coffee prices 
collapsed to almost a third of their 1995 value. On the other hand, exporters of cocoa and 
tea will have seen some recovery, while oil prices showed the largest increase. Even 
where the trend in prices is upward, Table 4 highlights the variations in commodity prices 
from one year to the next, which makes it extremely difficult to forecast prices. ‘If there 
is one stylised fact that tends to be applicable to commodity prices in general, it is that of 
general volatility rather than predictable trend movements’ (Newbold, Pfaffenzeller and 
Rayner, 2005: 493).  This variability in prices is the principal cause of instability of 
African export earnings and acts as a disincentive to investment. 
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Table 4: Trends in Primary Commodity Export Prices (1995 = 100) 
   
Commodity      1998  2000  2001  2002 
All Primary      79  116  106  106 
Food and Beverages    89  77  78  79 
 Cereals    79  67  70  80 
 Sugar    73  66  67  56 
 Coffee    82  50  35  36 
 Cocoa    117  63  76  124 
 Tea    145  151  121  109 
Agriculture Raw Materials    76  81  77  78 
 Cotton    67  60  49  47 
Minerals      74  82  74  72 
 Copper    56  62  54  53 
 Crude Petroleum  76  164  141  145 
Source: WTO (2003). 
 
The  African  ‘export  problem’  is  not  simply  the  general  dependence  on  primary 
commodity exports, but the heavy dependence of most countries on a narrow range of 
primary commodities. In the late 1990s, 39 African countries depended for more than 
half of their export earnings on just two primary commodities (UNCTAD, 1999: 33). The 
collapse of world commodity prices in 1998 was equivalent to a real income loss of 2.6 
percent of SSA gross domestic product (GDP) in 1997-98 (UNCTAD, 1999: 29). Zambia 
illustrates a severe case of dependence on a badly performing commodity, copper in this 
case. Commodity prices have not shown any dramatic sign of recovery in recent years. 
For example, world coffee prices in 2002 were below a third of the level in 1997. The 
implications of primary commodity dependence and the difficulty of diversifying exports 
will be addressed in Section 5.  
 
Countries with high shares of manufactures in their exports are relatively protected from 
unstable  export  earnings,  although they  are  operating  in  a  competitive  world  market. 
South Africa is the only African country with a significant share of diverse manufactures 
in exports. Mauritius and some North African countries (such as Morocco and Tunisia) 
have  significant  exports  of  textile  and  clothing  manufactures,  but  these  rely  to  some 
extent on preferential access to the EU (and may be eroded by the dramatic growth of 
Chinese  exports  following  the  end  of  the  Multifiber  Arrangement  (MFA)).  Other 
countries, such as Lesotho and Kenya, have increased clothing exports to benefit from 
preferential access to the US under AGOA. In general, preferential access to developed 
country  markets  has  been  an  important  feature  of  African  exports.  A  downside  of 
multilateral trade liberalisation is that it erodes the margin of these preferences. African 
countries have enjoyed preferential access to markets of Organisation for Economic Co-
operation  and  Development  (OECD)  countries,  especially  the  EU;  although  this  has 
facilitated exports, preferences have not worked to support export diversification. Erosion 
of  trade  preferences  will  imply  losses  for  some  African  countries;  although  this  will 
rarely be significant for agriculture exports, it may be significant for manufactures such   5 
 
 
as  textiles  (Mold,  2004).  Erosion  of  preferences  will  increase  the  challenge  facing 
African countries attempting to diversify exports beyond processing of commodities.  
 
A few countries account for most of all Africa’s exports. In 2000, only six countries had 
individual  shares  above  five  percent  of  total  African  exports  (South  Africa,  Nigeria, 
Algeria, Libya, Angola and Morocco), and together accounted for almost 70 percent of 
African exports, whereas in 1980 they had accounted for 76 percent of African exports 
(WTO, 2001: 77). Three of these are very dependent on oil and a fourth (Angola) on 
minerals more generally. There are other African countries that have had export success, 
but these are small countries (even relative to Africa) and their success is usually due to 
specific features. For example, Botswana has managed its diamond resources well and 
had  a  steady  export  performance  (although  the  export/GDP  ratio  fell  from  over  50 
percent in the early 1990s to almost 30 percent by the end of the decade, Appendix Table 
B), while Mauritius has benefited from preferential access to the EU for its sugar and 
clothing exports (maintaining an export/GDP ratio above 60 percent in the 1990s).
1 The 
majority  of  SSA  countries,  however,  are  economically  small  and  dependent  for  their 
exports on relatively low-value primary commodities. 
 
Section 3:Why Trade Policy Reform? 
 
Although  SSA  countries  may  not  be  important  relative  to  world  trade,  trade  is 
economically important for these countries. The vast majority of SSA countries have had 
restrictive and distortionary trade policies since independence until the 1980s (at least), 
typically  motivated  by some  desire  to  protect domestic industries. Irrespective  of  the 
merits  of  supporting  domestic  producers,  most  economists  would  agree  that  trade 
restrictions are not the best way of achieving this objective. For one reason or another, 
many SSA policy-makers have become persuaded that trade restrictions are not the best 
way to support domestic producers. In many cases, it was the World Bank and other 
donors that exercised the persuasion (Greenaway and Morrissey, 1994), although more 
recently participation in the WTO has become a force for change. Whatever the reason, 
the end result is that most SSA countries have begun implementing trade policy reforms, 
some earlier and more extensively than others. These reforms have aimed to make it 
easier to import, by reducing tariffs and non-tariff barriers, and to encourage exports, by 
eliminating export taxes and providing incentives. Before discussing these reforms and 
their effects, it is worth digressing to consider why policy-makers may find trade reform 
attractive.  
 
There are four broad ways in which trade benefits an economy (see Box 1), and trade 
policy reforms are intended to increase the ability to avail of these benefits. First, trade 
implies  that  the  country  has  access  to  a  global  market  that  is  much  larger  than  the 
domestic  market.  For  many  products,  production  costs  fall  as  the  volume  produced 
increases,  so  access  to  a  larger  market  increases  the  amount  that  can  be  produced 
competitively. This is especially beneficial for small countries. Second, trade encourages 
                                                 
1  The erosion of preferences could have a severe impact on Mauritius, as competition from East Asia, 
especially China, crowds out clothing exports while reform of the Sugar Protocol reduces the value of sugar 
exports to the EU (a problem faced by many SSA countries).   6 
 
 
a  more  efficient  allocation  of  resources.  Countries  are  encouraged  to  concentrate  on 
producing goods in which they are internationally competitive. These are then exchanged 
globally for goods the country cannot produce efficiently (exports are traded for imports). 
Third, in this way, imports increase consumption possibilities by expanding the variety of 
goods available. A country can gain access to goods it is unable to produce itself, or at 
least that it is unable to produce efficiently. Taken together, these are the static gains 
from trade – countries can expand production and consumption possibilities and allocate 
resources more efficiently. 
 
Box 1: Potential and Challenges of Trade 
Engaging  in  trade  does  not  guarantee  net  benefits,  rather  it  provides 
opportunities to which an economy must respond but also present challenges: 
·  exports imply access the global market and permit increased production;  
·  trade encourages efficient allocation of resources;  
·  imports increase consumption possibilities; and  
·  trade contributes to economic growth by generating long-run gains.  
 
However, 
·  exporters face competitors on a world market; 
·  competition from imports challenges local producers; and  
·  imports may increase faster than exports, resulting in a balance of payments 
deficit that imposes macroeconomic adjustment costs on the economy. 
 
If  local  producers  increase  their  competitiveness  and  the  economy  is  able  to 
reallocate resources, the country can benefit from openness to trade. For SSA 
countries,  although  trade  reform  provides  benefits  these  are  unlikely  to  be 
significant in magnitude (at least in the medium term). 
 
The fourth benefit is that trade can contribute to economic growth. One aspect of this is 
that  the  cumulative  effect  of  the  static  gains  may  be  to  generate  dynamic  gains.  As 
countries engage in trade, they engage with the rest of the world. There are incentives to 
avail  of  new  techniques  and technologies  to  increase  efficiency,  and  imports  provide 
access  to  these.  Increases  in  efficiency  and  trade  stimulate  growth.  There  is  also  a 
macroeconomic stimulation to growth as exports earn foreign exchange that can purchase 
imported  inputs  and  technology,  permitting  domestic  demand  to  grow  faster  without 
generating a balance of payments deficit. Thirlwall (2003: 16-20) argues that an increase 
in  consumption  or  investment  components  of  domestic  demand  will  tend  to  increase 
imports; if this is not ‘covered’ by increased exports, the resulting trade deficit will create 
macroeconomic imbalances that retard growth. 
 
Associated  with  these  gains,  however,  are  costs  and  challenges.  Exporters  have  to 
compete with producers from other countries, so there is no guarantee that access to the 
world market will lead to an increase in the value of exports. Access to an increased 
variety  of  cheap,  or  cheaper  (than  domestically  produced),  goods  is  a  benefit  to 
consumers  but  a  challenge  to  local  producers  of  import-competing  goods  that  face 
increased  competition.  Some  local  firms  will  fail,  imposing  adjustment  costs  on  the   7 
 
 
economy. The challenge is how local firms can respond to the competition and how the 
economy  can  adjust,  i.e.  can  it  reallocate  resources  effectively.  The  latter  depends 
crucially  on  the  ability  of  export  sectors  to  expand;  exporters  face  the  challenge  of 
competing on the world market. It is certainly not inevitable that the end effect is a net 
cost to the economy. If sufficient local firms can become competitive and the economy 
does reallocate resources, the country can rise to the challenge and benefit from trade. 
 
There are also potential adjustment costs on the macroeconomic side. Specifically, if 
imports grow faster than exports, the result is a balance of payments deficit that can have 
an adverse effect on growth. While such an imbalance cannot persist in the long-run, it 
has often been observed following trade liberalisation (Thirlwall, 2003: 22). An example 
is  provided  by  Ethiopia,  where  the  trade  deficit  widened  in  the  1990s  as  imports 
increased from 12 to 28 percent of GDP but exports only rose from six to 15 percent of 
GDP (Appendix table B). This is not surprising as reforms can have a direct effect on 
imports,  there  being  unconstrained  supply  from  the  rest  of  the  world,  whereas  the 
responsiveness of exports is much slower. Trade reforms can generate a payments deficit 
in the short-run, imposing macroeconomic adjustment costs on the economy. 
 
There are gains from trade, especially for relatively small countries (and most African 
countries are small in this sense) who need the larger foreign markets to provide demand 
for their products. However, there is no reason to suppose that the gains from trade are 
particularly large (relative to GDP) or evenly distributed, and some countries may even 
lose. Those SSA countries that depend on a few primary commodities for their exports 
are the least likely to gain from trade, as the growth benefit from exporting is crucially 
dependent on price and income elasticities of demand. One country’s growth rate relative 
to all others ‘is equi-proportional to the ratio of the income elasticities of demand for 
exports and imports’ (Thirlwall, 2003: 22). Many SSA countries have experienced slow 
growth  because  demand  for  their  exports  is  not  very  responsive  to  world  incomes, 
whereas their demand for imports is more responsive to their income. 
 
Thus,  trade  presents  both  opportunities  and  challenges,  and  the  latter  are  often  more 
direct and immediate than the former. The opportunities are heavily influenced by what 
other countries do; the potential gains from trade are greatest if all countries act together. 
It is in this respect, access to foreign markets, that multilateral (WTO) and regional trade 
liberalisation is so important. Nevertheless, a country’s own policies can affect its ability 
to avail of opportunities, for example by supporting the competitiveness of export sectors, 
and can influence the willingness of other countries to grant access.  
 
3.1  Measuring Trade Policy Reform 
 
In principle, any policy reform that alters the ease of importing or exporting could be 
considered as relating to trade. It is obvious that a wide range of policy instruments may 
be used to affect, directly or indirectly, the value and volume of trade, and there is no 
ready way of adding together various instruments. Furthermore, to evaluate trade reform 
one wants to be able to capture the effects on prices, from which one can then evaluate 
effects on volumes and impacts on the economy. It is quite easy to measure changes in   8 
 
 
tax instruments, such as tariffs or export taxes, and these have quite direct effects on 
prices. While changes in other instruments can sometimes be identified easily, such as 
reducing quantitative restrictions or relaxing non-tariff barriers, the effects on prices can 
only be quantified with difficulty. Furthermore, instruments may be applied and altered 
at varying levels of intensity across different products, making it difficult to provide an 
aggregate summary of reforms, and even more difficult to evaluate the effect on prices 
and incentives. This is a major problem for SSA countries that have reformed complex 
trade regimes in a piecemeal manner (Milner and Morrissey, 1999). Consequently, it is 
extremely difficult to produce comprehensive summary measures of trade policy reform 
for  one  country,  never  mind  for  comparing  countries  over  time.    A  common  and 
expedient approach in the face of this difficulty is to use relatively simple measures and 
acknowledge their weaknesses. 
 
There is a large literature on theoretical representation and empirical measurement of 
trade policy reform (Greenaway and Milner, 1993), but two relatively simple measures 
are used most frequently. The first is the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP, often 
referred to as a measure of openness but more appropriately considered a trade volume 
measure. As a country with a less restrictive trade policy is more open to trade, it could 
be  expected  to  have  a larger trade  volume  relative  to  countries  with restrictive  trade 
policies. The trade volume measure has particular weaknesses that make it inappropriate 
as a measure of trade liberalisation, i.e. inappropriate to capture changes in trade policy.
2 
The  major  weakness,  especially  in  the  context  of  SSA  countries,  is  that  exports  are 
largely determined by factors other than a country’s trade policy, such as world demand 
and prices, and major commodity producers can have high export/GDP ratios even if they 
have  very  restrictive  trade  policies  (e.g.  Nigeria).  Another  weakness  is  that  the 
denominator (GDP) can change for reasons unrelated to trade. 
 
The second simple measure of trade policy is to calculate some average of the scheduled 
tariffs, a measure of nominal protection. To assess the effects on prices, one would like to 
know the actual tariff paid (collected tariff as a percentage of the import price). This, 
however, will depend on other factors such as exemptions, preferences and evasion, and 
data are often not available. Although the scheduled tariff is not the actual tax paid on 
imports,  one  can  argue  that  it  captures  policy  as  it  represents  what  policy-makers 
intended. Furthermore, as one is averaging across all tariffs to get a summary, it is a 
reasonable representation of the policy intention, and changes should capture at least the 
direction, if not the degree, of policy reform. 
 
The  change  in  the  average  scheduled  tariff  is  not  a  very  accurate  measure,  but  is 
indicative  of  tariff  policy  reform  (Box  2).  However,  this  is  only  one  part  of  import 
liberalisation, so it may not be good indicator of trade reform. Non-tariff barriers, such as 
import quotas, are not accounted for. These are important restrictions on trade in many 
                                                 
2 Consider two examples, using data in Appendix Tables A and B. Nigeria has high average tariffs (30% in 
2000-02) and high trade volume (80% of GDP in 1998-2000) relative to the African average. So does 
Tunisia (average tariffs 34% and trade volume 89% in the same periods). Although trade volume suggests 
both or relatively open, the high tariffs show they are relatively restrictive. Rwanda and Uganda provide 
examples of countries with low tariffs but also relatively low trade volumes.   9 
 
 
SSA  countries  and  their  removal  represents  a  significant  liberalisation,  the  effect  of 
which is not captured by a measure of tariff changes.
3 As a quota is more restrictive than 
an equivalent tariff, the process of replacing quotas with tariffs is a liberalisation of the 
import regime. Such a process could give rise to an increase in the measured average 
tariff as the number of products subject to tariffs is increased. This would be misleading 
if the products subject to quotas initially had zero scheduled tariffs. As the average tariff 
measure does not account for this, one should look for information on changes in non-
tariff barriers, especially quotas, to obtain a better picture of overall import liberalisation. 
 
 
Box 2– Measuring Average Tariffs  
There are problems associated with averaging tariffs across all products. Ideally, one 
would want to weight tariffs on products according to the importance of the product in 
total imports. For example, a 20 percent tariff on products that account for a large share 
of imports should be given greater weight in the average than a 5% (or 60%) tariff on 
products for which there are negligible imports.  Typically, however, the data required to 
construct  weights  is  not  readily  available.  A  related  problem  is  that  some  scheduled 
tariffs are redundant as there are no imports of the products to which they apply. To the 
extent that redundant tariffs are most often those at the highest rates, their presence will 
mean that the unweighted average tends to overstate the true average. As the unweighted 
average is simply the average scheduled tariff across the number of products listed, it 
tends towards the modal rather than the mean value and any bias of redundant tariffs is 
unlikely to be great. It is generally true that the pattern of unweighted average tariffs 
across countries will reflect the pattern of tariff protection across those countries. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that the average nominal tariff is not an accurate indicator of 
the effects of reforms on relative incentives. As it is only an average measure of gross 
tariff protection on domestic output, i.e. the extent to which domestic producers can raise 
the price of those outputs, it fails to account for the effect of trade taxes on intermediate 
inputs.    The  effective  rate  of  protection  accounts  for  taxes  on  inputs  and  outputs, 
providing a measure of the protection afforded to value added (which more accurately 
captures the effect on production incentives. Furthermore, nominal protection is generally 
greater for importables than for exportables (which often have zero protection or are 
taxed), so that effective protection of exports is frequently negative and invariably less 
than  that  for  import-competing  goods.  Unfortunately,  the  data  requirements  for 
estimating  effective  protection  are  reasonably  demanding  and  such  measures  are  not 





                                                 
3 Changes in non-tariff barriers can be captured by measuring trade reform as changes in tariff equivalents 
(Milner and Morrissey, 1999). This approach shows significant liberalisation in Africa from the mid 1980s 
(Ancharaz, 2003).  
4 Greenaway and Milner (1993: 92) list 25 studies of effective protection (published in 1990 or earlier), 
only four of which relate to SSA countries. The number of studies has not increased greatly since then. 
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3.2  Natural Barriers to Trade 
 
Policy barriers, and especially trade policy, may be only a part (and often a small part) of 
the total barriers to trade, the various factors that increase the transactions costs of trade. 
Some  recent  literature  has  measured  ‘natural’  or  geographic  barriers,  such  as  those 
associated  with  distance,  being  remote  or  landlocked,  usually  focussing  on  transport 
costs  as  a  major  source  of  trade  barriers  and  of  effective  ‘taxation’  of  exports  (e.g. 
Milner, Morrissey and Rudaheranwa, 2000).  This latter issue can be very important for 
‘small’ countries that have to bear the costs of importing and of exporting, i.e. they are 
unable  to  shift  trade  costs  to  foreign  markets  (as  competition  is  intense  from  more 
favourably placed producers). It is likely to be the case for many African countries that 
even if policy barriers to trade are reduced significantly, substantial non-policy barriers 
remain, and these tend to discriminate against exporters. This is one reason why export 
supply response is often low for African countries. 
 
Transport cost is one of the more obvious non-policy barriers to trade. It is a particular 
problem  in  SSA,  not  only  for  the many  landlocked  countries  but  also  because most 
countries with sea coasts also have large interiors. One proxy for transport costs is to 
compare the ‘cost, insurance and freight’ (cif) price with the ‘free on board’ (fob) price 
of  imports.  As  the  former  includes  transport,  the  ratio  captures  the  significance  of 
transport costs. For example, a cif/fob ratio of 1.2 suggests that transport and related 
costs are 20 percent of the fob price. Table 5 compares such ratios for various regions of 
the world in 1980, 1990 and 1994. 
 
  Table 5: Transport Costs, by World Region (selected years) 
 
Region  cif/fob ratio 
  1980  1990  1994 
Sub-Saharan Africa  1.112  1.115  1.157 
Asia  1.093  1.086  1.086 
Central and Eastern Europe  1.201  1.212  1.078 
Middle East  1.124  1.103  1.108 
Latin America  1.094  1.091  1.083 
Western Europe  1.056  1.053  1.047 
Notes: Figures are the ratio of cif and fob import prices, averages by region. 
Source: Derived from International Monetary Fund (IMF) (1995). 
 
Two interesting patterns emerge. The first is that for all regions except SSA, transport 
costs (measured in this way) declined between 1980 and 1994 – SSA is the only region in 
which transport costs increased. In most regions except for Central and Eastern Europe, 
this decline was moderate, but by 1994 transport costs were less than 10 percent. The 
second observation is that, by 1994, SSA had the highest transport costs of any region. 
Such costs are a barrier to trade: they are equivalent to a tax on exports, making African 
countries less competitive, and they increase the price of imports (thereby conferring 
some natural protection on domestic producers).  
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Section 4: Trade Policy Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Since the 1980s, and especially in the 1990s, almost all African countries liberalised 
their trade regime to some extent, and many countries reduced trade barriers significantly 
(especially  restrictions  on  imports).  In  most  cases,  these  trade  policy  reforms  were 
undertaken unilaterally under the auspices of a World Bank programme. Although the 
vast majority of African countries signed the Uruguay Round Agreement in Marrakech 
in December 1994 and therefore were members of the WTO at its establishment, the 
WTO has not been the driving force for trade liberalisation in the continent. Although 
there has been a proliferation of regional trading agreements (RTAs) in the continent, 
few of these have been associated with significant trade policy reform. Consequently, in 
this section the focus is on unilateral trade reforms. 
 
A broad picture of trade policy reform can be obtained by examining trends in tariffs. 
Although, as mentioned above, there are limitations of average tariff measures, it is the 
one measure that is fairly widely available for many countries at different points in time. 
Even still, the data are patchy. The data presented here are based on average (scheduled, 
unweighted) tariffs for as many countries as available covering three periods – 1980-85, 
1990-95 and 2000-02. Where data were available for more than one year in any period, 
the average for available years is calculated. This indicates the pattern of changes in 
average tariffs shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: The Pattern of Tariff Changes in Africa 
 
  Average Scheduled Tariffs  % change 
    1980-85  1990-95  2000-02  1990-2002 
All Africa (29)  32.8  23.2  16.1  -30.6 
 
Regions 
       
North Africa (4)  35.2  27.2  24.3  -10.7 
West Africa (10)  38.5  23.4  14.4  -38.5 
Central Africa (6)  33.1  20.4  16.4  -19.6 
East Africa (5)  32.5  26.1  16.0  -38.7 
Southern Africa (4)  19.5  17.7  12.9  -27.1 
 
Export orientation 
       
Manufacturing  28.1  20.4  16.5  -19.1 
Agriculture  40.2  22.5  14.5  -35.6 
Mining/resources  50.5  18.4  13.2  -28.3 
Oil  30.7  25.2  20.2  -19.8 
Notes:  Figures  reported  are  simple  averages  across  countries  in  each  group  for  average 
unweighted scheduled tariffs reported for a year within the relevant period. Total sample is 29 
countries with tariff data for at least two periods (see Appendix Table A), with numbers per 
region in parentheses (see Appendix for list). 
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The figures in Table 6 are simple averages in three senses. First, for each country they 
are  unweighted  averages  of  scheduled  tariffs.  Second,  within  each  period  they  are 
averages of annual values for each country (although often there is only one observation 
for a country in any period). Finally, they are simple averages, not weighted by trade, 
across countries in each of the groups (and are thus affected by individual countries that 
may have very low, or very high, values). African countries are grouped by region, and 
by ‘export orientation’ – whether it is manufactures, agriculture, mining products or oil 
that  are  major  export  commodities.  The  countries  in  each  group  are  listed  in  the 
Appendix. The classification by export orientation is useful insofar as manufactures and 
oil are likely to be more stable sources of export earnings than agriculture or mining. 
 
Being simple averages, the data are no more than indicative, but some clear patterns 
emerge. Average tariffs have been reduced significantly, roughly halved on average, in 
Africa over the past 20 years. The final column reports the percentage reduction between 
the early 1990s and early 200s (for comparison with trade data in Section 5), and even in 
this latter period reductions were quite large, some 30 percent on average. Comparing 
different regions of Africa, although the overall variation or spread in tariffs has been 
reduced,  progress  varies.  North  Africa  reduced  tariffs  the  least,  especially  since  the 
1990s, and by 2000-02 had the highest tariffs of any region (this is influenced by Tunisia 
having increased tariffs). Southern Africa has consistently had the lowest tariffs (and the 
trend is influenced by significant reductions in South Africa). Although West Africa 
appears to show the greatest reduction, the 1980-85 value is distorted by very high tariffs 
in Guinea. Of the regions, East and West Africa reduced tariffs the most since the 1990s. 
 
Finally, we can observe some differences according to export orientation. In the 1980s, 
countries whose main exports were agriculture or mining tended to have high tariffs, 
whereas countries with significant exports of manufactures tended to have relatively low 
tariffs. By the 2000s, these differences had largely disappeared: the differences by export 
orientation  were  negligible,  except  that  oil  exporters  tended  to  have  higher  tariffs. 
Although the latter figure is distorted by Nigeria’s relatively high tariffs, even excluding 
Nigeria the average in 2000-02 would be almost 19 percent. It is perhaps surprising that 
the ‘manufacturing’ group had the least reduction in tariffs and the highest average in the 
2000s  after  the  ‘oil’  group,  but  this  may  reflect  the  composition  of  the  group.  The 
general pattern is that significant tariff reductions (trade liberalisation) can be observed 
in  almost  all  African  countries,  although  the  timing  and  extent  of  reductions  varies 
across countries.  
 
Table 7 reports data on average trade-weighted tariffs for 35 (SSA) countries. By the 
1990s,  three-quarters  of  the  SSA  countries  had  an  average  weighted  tariff  under  20 
percent,  and  only  two  countries  had  an  average  tariff  over  30  percent.    We  have 
information  to  compare  average  weighted  tariffs  in  the  1980s  and  1990s  for  the  26 
countries: 21 countries (80 percent  of the sample) had an average over 20 percent in the 
earlier period, but only six (23 percent of the sample) in the later period. About three-
quarters of these countries had average tariffs below 20 percent in the 1990s, suggesting 
the sample is quite representative of SSA. The pattern is consistent with the evidence in   13 
 
 
Appendix table A, suggesting that the use of unweighted tariffs gives a fairly reliable 
picture of the pattern of change. 
 
Table 7: Distribution of Average Trade-weighted Tariffs in SSA 
 
Average tariff  N=35  N=26 
  1990s  1980s  1990s 
Under 10%  6  3  6 
10-19%  21  2  14 
20-29%  6  8  4 
30-39%  2  10  2 
40% and over  0  3  0 
Notes: The column N=35 refers to a sample of observations for the mid to late 1990s, whereas 
N=26 refers to 26 countries for which values in the 1980s and 1990s can be compared. 
Source: Derived from data in WTO website. 
 
Table 8 provides more detailed data, reporting unweighted average tariffs for all goods, 
agricultural  goods  and  manufactures  (for  years  generally  in  the  mid-to-late  1990s).  
Although tariffs are generally higher in agriculture than manufacturing, the gap is rarely 
large and there are only two countries with average tariffs in agriculture in excess of 30 
percent (Burkina Faso and Rwanda).  It is interesting to note that SSA averages are 
relatively close, by this time, to the average for all developing countries; higher than East 
Asia and Latin America, but lower than South Asia. It is also worth noting that for other 
regions  tariffs  are  generally  lower  for  manufactures  than  for  other  goods  (all  or 
agriculture). This suggests that African exporters are globally disadvantaged because 
they tend to export goods facing relatively high tariffs elsewhere. 
 
Section 5: Policy and Trade Performance 
 
The presence of import barriers or restrictions creates an anti-export bias by raising the 
price of importable goods relative to exportable goods. Removal of this anti-export bias 
through trade liberalisation should encourage a shift of resources from the production of 
import substitutes to the production of exports. Following trade liberalisation, one would 
expect to see an increase in imports and exports, with domestic production of import-
competing  products  declining.  Typically,  import  supply  from  the  rest  of  the  world 
responds more rapidly than domestic export supply. Imports increase faster than exports, 
imposing adjustment costs, as jobs are lost in import-competing sectors faster than they 
are created in export sectors, and possibly increasing the trade deficit. The most obvious 
trade  policy  liberalisation  measures  are  reducing  the  average  tariff,  reducing  the 
dispersion of tariffs and reducing or eliminating non-tariff barriers to imports. All such 
forms of import liberalisation were implemented by African countries in the 1990s. The 
most  immediate  effect  is  to  make  it  easier  to  import  and,  specifically,  to  reduce  the 
domestic price of imports. One would therefore expect to observe an increase in imports 
following liberalisation. Table 9 shows that this was generally the case, with data on 
import and export trends in the 1990s for the same sample of African countries for which 




Table 8: Average Tariff Rates by Sector in SSA and Other Regions (1990s) 
 
Tariff Rate (%, unweighted)  Country 
Year  All 
Goods 
Agric.  Man. 
Benin  1996  13.1  13.7  12.8 
Botswana  1996  11.1  12.3  11.0 
Burkina Faso  1998  31.1  37.0  29.1 
Cameroon  1996  18.1  24.3  17.8 
Central Africa Rep  1997  7.0  7.6  6.8 
Chad  1997  15.8  17.0  15.5 
Congo Rep.  1997  17.6  18.0  17.5 
Cote d’Ivoire  1996  19.2  21.2  18.8 
Gabon  1998  20.6  25.1  19.7 
Ghana  1995  15.0  20.1  14.1 
Guinea  1998  16.4  16.6  16.3 
Kenya  1999  18.0  16.7  18.2 
Madagascar  1998  6.8  6.4  6.9 
Malawi  1998  15.7  15.6  15.7 
Mali  1999  11.2  16.1  10.4 
Mauritius  1998  19.0  14.9  19.5 
Mozambique  1997  15.6  16.9  15.3 
Nigeria  1998  23.4  23.0  24.0 
Rwanda  1993  34.8  58.0  31.1 
Senegal  1996  12.3  13.5  12.1 
South Africa  1999  8.5  8.0  8.6 
Tanzania  1999  16.1  17.4  16.2 
Togo  1997  13.3  13.6  13.3 
Uganda  1996  13.2  23.7  11.6 
Zambia  1997  13.6  15.9  13.0 
Zimbabwe  1998  22.2  27.0  21.7 
Averages for Regions (number of countries) 
All developing countries (96)  1993-99  13.1  17.0  12.4 
East Asia (15)  1994-99  9.8  13.9  9.4 
South Asia (5)  1996-99  27.7  26.3  28.0 
Sub-Saharan Africa (26)  1993-99  16.5  19.2  16.0 
Middle East & N. Africa (11)  1995-99  14.4  20.8  13.2 
Transition Europe (15)  1996-99  9.6  15.7  7.8 
Latin America (24)  1995-99  10.1  13.8  9.5 
  
Notes: Agric refers to agriculture products and Man to manufactures. 
Sources:  WTO,  IDB  CD  ROM  2000  and  Trade  Policy  Review,  various  issues,  1993-2000; 
World  Bank,  World  Development  Indicators,  2000;  and  UNCTAD,  World  Investment 
Report 2000. 
 




Table 9: Trade Performance in Africa (Tariff Data Sample) 
 
  Imports/GDP  Exports/GDP 
    90-92  98-00  % change  90-92  98-00  % change 
Regions             
North Africa (4)  34.1  32.1  -5.9  29.5  29.9  1.4 
West Africa (10)  32.3  38.4  18.9  26.5  29.5  11.3 
Central Africa (6)  27.3  30.8  12.8  23.6  28.4  20.3 
East Africa (5)  33.4  35.5  6.3  23.0  26.1  13.5 
Southern Africa (4)  30.6  37.2  21.6  26.6  30.8  15.8 
Notes: Columns give average import/GDP and exports/GDP ratios averaged over 
1990-92 and 1998-2000, and percentage change in ratios. Sample is those 
countries used for the pattern of tariff changes in Table 6. 
Sources: Derived from data in Appendix tables. 
 
Table 9 shows that it is not uniformly the case that regions that reduced tariffs the most 
experienced the greatest increase in imports, nor that import growth necessarily exceeded 
export growth. However, the broad pattern is as expected. North Africa, the region with 
the highest tariffs and that reduced tariffs the least, actually saw a decline in imports and 
very slow growth of exports. Southern Africa, with the lowest tariffs and a significant 
liberalisation, had the greatest increase in imports to a relatively high import/GDP ratio 
and relatively good export growth. West Africa, which also had significant liberalisation 
to relatively low tariffs, had high import growth but relatively modest export growth. 
These  regions  suggest a  relationship  from  relative  tariff  reductions  to  relative import 
performance. East Africa was the region with the greatest tariff reduction since the 1990s, 
but had low growth of imports and moderate growth of exports. Central Africa had the 
lowest tariff reduction for SSA regions, moderate import growth but the highest export 
growth. It is clear that trade performance, especially for exports, is only partly explained 
by tariff reductions. The remainder of this section explores trade performance further for 
a larger sample of countries. 
 
5.1  Trends in Imports 
 
For Africa overall, imports (measured relative to GDP) increased by some 12 percent 
during the decade of the 1990s, and increased in all regions except the North (Table 10). 
Although  North  Africa  is  the  only  region  for  which  the  sample  in  Table  10  (and 
subsequent  tables)  is  the  same  as  for  Table  9  (and  Table  6),  the  pattern  of  relative 
regional trade performance is similar for the two samples, so we can relate the trade 
performance  to  our  information  on  (relative)  tariff  reductions.  North  Africa  reduced 
tariffs the least (proportionally), had the highest average tariffs at the end of the decade, 
and import ratios fell. Southern Africa had consistently the lowest average tariffs and the 
highest  import/GDP  ratio.  This  high  starting  point  may  explain  why  the  percentage 
increase in imports was relatively low for the larger sample.  
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For the other three regions, there is no evident correlation of tariffs and tariff reductions 
to growth in imports. West Africa reduced tariffs significantly and to the lowest level (of 
these three regions), but did not have the highest import growth and actually has the 
lowest import/GDP ratio of the three regions. However, as the data for average tariffs are 
not weighted, whereas the data on trade performance are relative to GDP, one should not 
necessarily expect a strong correlation.  
 
Table 10: The Pattern of Import Performance in Africa (Country Groups) 
 
  Imports (% of GDP)  Change 
    1990-92  1998-00  % points  % 
All Africa (47)  39.4  44.7  5.3  13.5 
 
Regions 
       
North Africa (4)  34.1  32.1  -2.0  -5.9 
West Africa (15)  35.8  40.8  5.0  14.0 
Central Africa (9)  36.7  44.6  9.2  26.0 
East Africa (9)  39.0  46.5  7.5  19.2 
Southern Africa (10)  51.4  54.1  2.7  5.3 
 
Export orientation    
     
Manufacturing (18)  35.8  39.4  3.6  10.1 
Agriculture (10)  33.2  36.9  3.7  11.1 
Mining/resources (7)  35.3  42.0  6.7  19.0 
Oil (6)  30.8  35.1  4.3  14.0 
Notes: Change between 1990-92 and 1998-2000 averages is given in percentage 
points and in percentage terms. 
Sources: Derived from data in Appendix tables. 
 
Although oil exporting countries had the highest average tariffs in the 1990s, they also 
showed relatively high growth of imports, probably because buoyant demand for their 
exports allowed them to finance imports. Among the other groups of countries classed by 
export orientation, import shares and growth tends to be higher in those groups with 
lower tariffs. In particular, mining exporters tended to have the lowest tariffs but highest 
imports, whereas manufacturing exporters had relatively low tariff reductions and the 
lowest import growth. There is some indication that imports are highest and grow faster 
in countries with low and declining tariffs, whereas imports are least in countries with 
relatively high (or slowly declining) tariffs. However, the performance of exports is likely 
to be a more important determinant of import growth. 
 
5.2  Export Performance 
 
Although trade liberalisation does not usually affect actual export prices (as these are 
typically determined on a world market), it increases the return to exportables relative to 
the  return  to  importables.  Producers  of  importables  face  increased  competition  from 
cheaper imports, reducing the profits of those that remain competitive. The competitive   17 
 
 
position of producers of exportables is not adversely affected, and may be improved if 
they can access cheaper inputs and/or the trade reform included specific export promotion 
measures. Thus, the relative incentives to producers of exportables are improved. An 
adequate  export  response  is  usually  sufficient  to  ensure  that  the  net  impact  of  trade 
liberalisation is favourable. 
 
Table 11: The Pattern of Export Performance in Africa (Country Groups) 
 
  Exports (% of GDP)  Change 
    1990-92  1998-00  % points  % 
All Africa (47)  27.2  32.4  5.2  19.1 
 
Regions 
       
North Africa (4)  29.5  29.9  0.4  1.4 
West Africa (15)  25.3  28.6  3.2  12.6 
Central Africa (9)  22.2  35.2  13.0  58.6 
East Africa (9)  25.4  29.4  4.0  15.7 
Southern Africa (10)  35.5  39.1  3.6  10.1 
 
Export orientation    
     
Manufacturing (18)  26.9  31.4  4.5  16.7 
Agriculture (10)  21.9  27.3  5.4  24.7 
Mining/resources (7)  29.7  33.0  3.3  11.1 
Oil (6)  34.4  38.3  3.9  11.3 
Notes: Change between 1990-92 and 1998-2000 averages is given in percentage 
points and in percentage terms. 
Sources: Derived from data in Appendix tables. 
 
Table 11 shows that overall export growth in Africa was quite strong over the decade, 
with  the  export/GDP  ratio  increasing  by  almost  20  percent.  Interestingly,  the  lowest 
growth  was  in  North  Africa,  the  least  ‘liberalised’  region,  whereas  the  highest 
export/GDP  ratio  (with  moderate  growth)  is  in  Southern  Africa,  the  most  liberalised 
region. There are many factors affecting export performance. Domestic trade policy is 
only one, and rarely would it be the most important, at least in the short to medium term. 
Thus,  one  would  not  expect  to  observe  a  strong  correlation  between  relative  tariff 
reductions and relative export growth, although it is encouraging that export growth was 
generally strong throughout Africa. Only a few individual countries recorded sustained 
export growth in the 1990s, but these are mostly countries that reduced tariffs. Ghana is 
one example, where export growth supported rapid import growth (during the 1990s, 
import/GDP grew 107 percent whereas export/GDP grew 125 percent, Appendix Table 
B). 
 
As  export  performance  is  driven  by  trends  in  world  demand  and  prices  for  the 
commodities exported, performance across countries classified by export orientation is 
only weakly related to tariff reductions. Agriculture exporters reduced tariffs the most 
and had the most rapid export growth, but the other groups exhibit no clear pattern. As   18 
 
 
export earnings are the basis of financing imports, one might expect to see a relationship 
between export and import growth. This is evident comparing Tables 10 and 11. Regions 
with the highest export growth also tended to have the highest import growth, although 
no pattern emerges when countries are grouped by export orientation. The two come 
together in the effect on the balance of trade. 
 
5.3  Trade Balance 
 
In percentage terms, export growth exceeded import growth for Africa overall and in 
most  country  groups.  However,  as  import/GDP  ratios  were  initially  higher  than 
export/GDP ratios, this need not translate into an improvement in the trade balance. As 
Table 12 shows, the trade deficit for Africa overall was almost unchanged, at just over 12 
percent of GDP at the start and end of the 1990s. The deficit declined noticeably in North 
and Central Africa. In the former this can be attributed to a decline in imports (consistent 
with relatively high trade barriers), whereas in the latter it is due to the dramatic increase 
in exports (as a number of countries in this region emerged from political and economic 
instability during the period). The deficit declined slightly in Southern Africa, the region 
most dependent on imports. In West and especially East Africa was there a noticeable 
increase in the deficit. Interestingly, these are the regions in which average tariffs were 
reduced the most, highlighting the danger that, following rapid liberalisation, imports can 
increase faster than exports. 
 
Table 12: Trade Balance in Africa (as % of GDP) (Country Groups) 
 
  1990-92  1998-2000 
    M  X  X-M  M  X  X-M 
All Africa (47)  39.4  27.2  -12.2  44.7  32.4  -12.3 
 
Regions 
           
North Africa (4)  34.1  29.5  -4.6  32.1  29.9  -2.2 
West Africa (15)  35.8  25.3  -10.5  40.8  28.6  -12.2 
Central Africa (9)  36.7  22.2  -14.5  44.6  35.2  -9.4 
East Africa (9)  39.0  25.4  -13.6  46.5  29.4  -17.1 
Southern Africa (10)  51.4  35.5  -15.9  54.1  39.1  -15.0 
 
Export orientation  
           
Manufacturing (18)  35.8  26.9  -8.9  39.4  31.4  -8.0 
Agriculture (10)  33.2  21.9  -11.3  36.9  27.3  -9.6 
Mining/resources (7)  35.3  29.7  -5.6  42.0  33.0  -9.0 
Oil (6)  30.8  34.4  3.6  35.1  38.3  3.2 
Notes: Columns give imports (M), exports (X) and the trade balance (X-M), where 
a negative sign indicates a deficit, all expressed as percentages of GDP.  
Sources: Derived from data in Appendix tables. 
 
When  we  consider  countries  classed  according  to  export  orientation,  only  the  oil 
exporters as a group show a trade surplus (and this declined slightly). In terms of the   19 
 
 
reducing the trade deficit, the best performance was in agriculture exporters, for which 
the  deficit  declined  significantly  although  it  remained  high.  There  is  a  suggestion  of 
import compression in these exporters, as export/GDP ratios remain very low (exports 
would have to grow by some 40 percent, given constant imports, to eliminate the deficit). 
In particular countries, import surges are not unusual, so sustaining a reduction in the 
trade deficit is difficult if exports are flat (e.g. in Malawi, imports roughly doubled from 
30 percent of GDP to 60 percent between 1992 and 1994 but exports did not change). 
Exporters of manufactures reduced the deficit slightly. Exporters of mining resources 
displayed the worst performance, with the deficit increasing by over a third.  
 
These results show that there is a potential danger from relatively rapid liberalisation, as 
import supply is more immediately responsive than export supply. This problem is most 
pronounced for countries exporting primary commodities subject to weak and volatile 
world prices. Kenya, for example, has experienced an increasing trade deficit; in the 
1990s, import/GDP rose 15 percent but export/GDP fell by four percent (Appendix Table 
B).  Oil  exporters  have  fared  reasonably  well  and  maintained  a  surplus  as  a  group, 
although this was significantly reduced in the late 1990s (e.g. in Gabon it fell from 14 
percent to four percent of GDP in the 1990s, Appendix table B) and agriculture exporters 
have fared better than may be expected (reducing the size of the deficit for the group). 
Countries  dependent  on  mining  exports,  however,  have  not  fared  well  in  the  1990s. 
Whilst overall, it would be wrong to conclude that Africa has not gained from trade 
liberalisation in the 1990s, export supply response has been a major constraint in many 
countries.  This  is  one  reason  why  trade  reforms  may  not  have  delivered  the  growth 
dividend anticipated. 
 
5.4  Trade and Growth: The Importance of Exports 
 
The empirical evidence on the relationship between trade and economic growth can be 
quite confusing, as often studies are writing about different issues. Some commentators 
take  a  narrow  focus  on  the  association  between  exports  and  growth.  Exports,  by 
providing a market for surplus and by earning foreign exchange (to finance imports), will 
tend to be associated with growth. This need not require a very liberal import regime. 
Nevertheless, many commentators refer to the openness of the trade regime, the core 
argument  being  that  minimising  protection  against  imports  reduces  relative  price 
distortions and encourages production of exportables. Some commentators take a very 
broad  focus,  considering  the  openness  of  the  regime  not  only  to  imports  but  also  to 
foreign investment, technology, institutions and ideas (Rodrik, 1999). Our interest is the 
middle ground, of the link between trade policy and growth. 
 
For small economies, and all African economies are small in this sense, export expansion 
can be the driver of growth. Uganda is an example of a country for which this was the 
case (export/GDP grew by 35 percent in the 1990s, although import/GDP grew by only 
four percent, Appendix Table B). Countries that achieve high export growth rates also 
achieve high economic growth rates, whereas it is rare for a small economy to achieve 
high economic growth without export growth. However, it is not so clearly evident that 
trade liberalisation increases exports and therefore contributes to growth (Greenaway,   20 
 
 
Morgan and Wright, 1998). As observed above for SSA in the 1990s, imports often grow 
faster than exports following trade liberalisation, such that in the short to medium term 
the impact on growth may be minimal if not adverse. The long run gains require export 
growth, but this often fails in SSA because of constraints on export supply response. 
 
There are a number of reasons why the beneficial impact of trade policy on growth may 
be muted in Africa. A general problem is that there is a weak link between unilateral 
trade policy reforms and the effect on export trade. Domestic policy reforms have their 
direct  effect  on  imports,  while  export  performance  is  largely  determined  by  external 
factors, notably world prices and demand. In the latter respect, multilateral (and regional) 
trade liberalisation  can be  important  because it  increases  countries’  access  to  foreign 
markets. Specific concerns relate to the structure of African exports, and these are most 
relevant for SSA countries (as few of these are significant exporters of manufactures). 
The  structure  of  SSA  exports  generates  two  problems  for  growth  –  commodity 
dependence and high trade costs. 
 
First, SSA countries relative endowments of land and natural resources result in export 
dependency on primary commodities. This subjects exports to the vagaries of a volatile 
world market and the economy is vulnerable to terms of trade shocks and volatile export 
earnings, both of which have negative impacts of growth. It also means that exports are 
likely to be relatively bulky with high volume-to-price ratios, hence relatively high unit 
transport  costs.  This  links  to  the  second  factor,  SSA  countries  tend  to  face  ‘natural 
barriers’ that increase the costs of trade – imports are more expensive and exporting more 
costly. While these barriers confer protection to producers of importables, they imply 
effective  taxation  of  exports  (Milner,  Morrissey  and  Rudaheranwa,  2000).  Transport 
costs are the most obvious such costs. Many SSA countries are landlocked (and suffer the 
additional costs of slow Customs procedures at borders) and many of those that are not 
have large interiors. The primary commodities they produce have to be transported large 
distances overland to reach ports; road and rail systems tend to be inefficient throughout 
SSA, and sea shipping costs are relatively high.  
 
Resource  endowments  will  be  a  major  determinant  of  trade  structure.  A  standard 
hypothesis is that countries with relatively low endowments of natural resources, thus 
relatively high labour endowments, will need to industrialise to promote export growth 
and  utilise  their  comparative  advantage.  However,  countries  endowed  with  natural 
resources  coupled  with  low  skill  levels  will  tend  to  have  export  dependence  on 
unprocessed primary commodities. This can retard growth because extractive industries 
have  weak  linkages  with  the  rest  of  the  economy,  agricultural  exports  are  largely 
unprocessed and primary commodities tend to face volatile and deteriorating terms of 
trade.  Although  having  an  abundance  of  primary  commodities  to  export  is,  in  itself, 
beneficial, problems arise for those countries dependent on a narrow range of primary 
commodities  (Lederman  and  Maloney,  2003).  Under  such  an  environment,  trade 
liberalisation will confer limited benefits – the capacity of the export sector to respond is 
constrained, whereas domestic producers will face increased competition from imports. 
This may help, in particular, to explain Africa’s poor growth performance. 
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Although the evidence that trade liberalisation increases growth is weak (Mbabazi, Milner 
and Morrissey, 2003), there is almost no evidence that trade liberalisation retards growth 
beyond the short-term adverse effect on the balance of payments discussed above. Whilst 
increased  competition  from  imports  could  have  adverse  effects  on  manufacturing 
industries, there is no convincing evidence that trade reforms caused de-industrialisation 
in  Africa  (Bennell,  1998).  In  general,  trade  liberalisation  offers  benefits  to  African 
countries.  The  evidence  is  stronger  that  exports  promote  growth,  even  in  African 
countries. There is some evidence that growth has been higher in more outward oriented 
SSA economies, suggesting that trade liberalisation offers the potential for SSA countries 
to  increase  growth  rates  (Onafowora  and  Owoye,  1998).  Even  in  those  countries 
dependent on primary commodity exports, a less restrictive trade regime is conducive to 
increased efficiency of resource allocation and hence growth. 
 
5.5  Constraints on Export Supply Response 
 
Trade liberalisation is expected to remove the relative disincentive to produce exports and 
the anticipated beneficial effect is that exports will increase and, in turn, fuel economic 
growth. However, trade policy is only one factor constraining exports, and relative prices 
are rarely the major constraint on export supply response. For countries dependent on 
agricultural exports, non-trade policies (e.g. marketing boards and price controls) have 
often  been  biased  against  agriculture  and  discouraged  export  production.  In  addition, 
farmers face many constraints in gaining access to factors, inputs and technology that 
limit their ability to increase production in response to improved (export) price incentives 
(McKay,  Morrissey  and  Vaillant,  1997).  Given  the  many  and  varied  constraints  to 
increasing production and distribution of primary commodities, one may not observe a 
quick export response to trade liberalisation. This does not mean that trade reforms should 
not be undertaken, but one should exercise care in interpreting the evidence. 
 
As mentioned previously, transport costs can be quite high for many SSA countries and 
this can act as an important constraint on primary commodity exports. Transport costs 
are some 15 percent of unit values on average in Africa, which is considerably higher 
than  the  averages  for  other  developing  country  regions.  Table  13  illustrates  the 
importance of transport costs, reporting the cif/fob ratio for groups of African countries. 
Unsurprisingly,  Landlocked  countries  (or  Central  Africa,  which  is  similar)  face  the 
highest transport costs, of over 20 percent unit values, while North Africa faces the 
lowest transport costs. In general, transport costs declined slightly between 1980 and 
1994. The main exceptions are landlocked, Southern Africa and Agriculture groups. The 
increases in all of these groups are largely due to Malawi, where the ratio in 1994 rose to 
1.67 (because the war in Mozambique denied the shortest route to the sea). 
 
Differences  in  transport  costs  between  groups  of  countries  reflect  differences  in  the 
direction and composition of trade as well as location characteristics. The latter seems 
most important, as there are few consistent patterns across countries grouped by export 
orientation (although manufactures appear to have the lowest costs). Remoteness, poor 
infrastructure and being landlocked are clearly damaging to trade because they raise 
trade costs, and such costs are a particular burden on African countries.   22 
 
 
Table 13: Transport Costs in Africa, Country Groups 
 
Grouping  cif/fob ratio 
    1980  1994 
Landlocked Countries  1.227  1.249 
 
Regions 
   
North Africa  1.101  1.096 
West Africa  1.196  1.191 
Central Africa  1.244  1.224 
East Africa  1.161  1.146 
Southern Africa  1.137  1.222 
 
Export orientation 
   
Manufacturing  1.144  1.128 
Agriculture  1.168  1.196 
Mining/resources  1.197  1.139 
Oil  1.148  1.152 
  Source: Derived from data in IMF (1995). 
 
A more general point can be made regarding the link between trade liberalisation and 
openness. While the latter may give rise to concerns regarding the competitiveness of 
domestic  producers  of  importables,  access  to  imported  investment  goods  and  the 
technology embodied in imports may be very beneficial. Furthermore, trade openness and 
being seen to implement trade reforms may attract foreign investment. Foreign investors 
tend to be attracted to countries with relatively open trade regimes and increasing trade 
volumes.  Furthermore,  the  injection  of  funds,  know-how  and  marketing  contacts 
associated with foreign investment may itself be a boost to exports. 
 
Section 6: Conclusion 
 
There  is  no  doubt  that  SSA  countries  have  liberalised  their  trade  regimes  quite 
significantly over the past decade or so. The pace and pattern of trade reforms varies 
from  country  to  country,  but  the  broad  trend  is  towards  lower  barriers  to  imports. 
Evidence for this can be found in lower average tariffs, and perhaps more significantly in 
increases  in  imports  as  a  share  of  GDP.  Multilateral  and  regional  agreements  have 
committed  them  to  these  reforms  –  the  clock  cannot  be  turned  back,  although  the 
appropriate pace of future liberalisation is an important policy issue. To date, there is 
little aggregate evidence that the trade policy reforms and liberalisation since the late 
1980s  have  produced  a  significant  export  response.  Exports  have  not  increased 
consistently, and there is no evident correlation between the extent of trade liberalisation 
and the rate at which exports have grown. There is some tendency for imports to grow 
faster  than  exports  following  liberalisation,  increasing  the  trade  deficit  and  thus 
constraining growth. The major problem facing SSA is not trade reform per se but rather 
how to diversify and increase exports. 
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There are many explanations as to why the export response to trade liberalisation in SSA 
has been limited.  These include factors relating to the effectiveness of the liberalisation 
itself (what trade reforms were actually implemented), and to the response of producers 
to  the  apparent  shift  in  the  incentive  structure  (do  they  believe  that  the  reforms  are 
credible and sustainable). However, trade liberalisation has now been sustained for some 
time in most SSA countries.  The issue for the future is how the effectiveness of trade 
reforms is contingent on the existence of other characteristics of the environment in 
which production and investment decisions are made. We have identified trade structure 
and constraints on supply response as predominant among these. Some commentators 
emphasise  the  role  of  institutional  (political  and  legal)  and  infrastructure  factors  in 
affecting  private  sector  confidence  in  achieving  and  securing  adequate  returns.    The 
simple point is that there are many factors other than trade policy that help explain the 
poor  export  performance  of  SSA  countries.  Consequently,  the  benefits  of  trade 
liberalisation may not be immediately apparent. This does not imply that, at the margin, 
trade policy reform is not beneficial.  
 
The importance of trade, and especially policies to enhance export performance, feature 
prominently in the Commission for Africa (2005). Transforming Africa into a dynamic 
exporting region is seen as central to achieving sustained economic growth and poverty 
reduction. The basic argument of the Report is that more needs to be done, globally and 
within African countries, to allow these countries to expand exports, and to diversify 
exports  away  from  dependence  on  a  narrow  range  of  (unprocessed)  primary 
commodities. Chapter 8 of the Report discusses trade and offers many sensible policy 
proposals, and the Commission for Africa (2005) advocates a substantial increase in aid 
to assist in implementing these and other proposals. Although the Commission for Africa 
(2005)  recognises  that  an  increase  in  imports  is  necessary  for  macroeconomic 
accommodation of the rapid growth in foreign exchange inflows associated with a large 
increase  in  aid,  there  is  surprisingly  little  discussion  of  imports.  Morrissey  (2005) 
questions the feasibility and desirability of a significant increase in imports (as we have 
seen above, import/GDP ratios are high and rising), and that the Commission for Africa 
(2005) is rather weak on how to implement trade reforms. Nevertheless, this reinforces 
the importance of trade on the African policy agenda. 
 
One of the keys to future prospects is ‘discovering’ how to bring about improved export 
performance. A core element of any strategy is the need to diversify exports. Trade 
liberalisation can do no more than provide opportunities – unilateral reforms increase 
relative incentives to exporters, and multilateral or regional liberalisation increase market 
access.  Domestic  policies  are  necessary  to  reduce  the  varied  constraints  on  supply 
response, increase transport and marketing efficiency, and encouraging investment. To 
benefit  from  trade,  and  channel  these  benefits  into  helping  reduce  poverty,  SSA 
countries need to increase the flexibility and efficiency of resource use so that they can 
be competitive in global markets. Policies in other countries, and especially multilateral 
and regional agreements, will be important in the long term, but will not ensure that any 
particular country is able to benefit from the opportunities provided by trade rather than 
succumbing to the challenges and costs. African countries should concentrate on their 
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APPENDIX - Country Classifications Used 
To summarise the data in the text, two ways of classifying countries (47 for which full trade data 
were available) were used. The first was relatively straightforward, classifying countries 
according to the geographical region of Africa in which they are located. The second classifies 
according to the relative importance of particular sectors in exports, termed export orientation. 
Four sectors were identified (following the WDI classification): manufactures, agriculture, 
mining and oil. The criterion used was to designate the sector as relatively important if it 
accounted for over 20 percent of merchandise exports, on average, in the 1990s. The 
classification should be considered as illustrative of African countries exporting products in these 
sectors. Data quality is poor so it is not a definitive list (for specific countries, sector shares can 
vary considerably from year to year). Furthermore, as the criterion is not based on the majority 
share of exports, a country could appear under more than one sector. The full list of countries 
included under each classification is given below.  
 
Classifications of Countries by Region 
North Africa (4): 
Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia.  
West Africa (15): 
Benin*, Burkina Faso*, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire*, Gambia, Ghana*, Guinea*, Guinea Bissau, 
Mali, Mauritania*, Niger, Nigeria*, Senegal*, Sierra Leone* and Togo*. 
Central Africa (9): 
Burundi*, Cameroon*, Central African Republic*, Chad, Congo (Republic)*, Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon*, Rwanda* and Sao Tome and Principe. 
East Africa (9): 
Comoros, Eritrea, Ethiopia*, Kenya*, Madagascar, Mauritius*, Seychelles, Tanzania* and 
Uganda*. 
Southern Africa (10):     
Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi*, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa*, Swaziland, 
Zambia* and Zimbabwe*. 
Countries for which observations on average tariffs were available for at least two 
periods (Appendix Table A) are denoted with *. 
 
Classifications of Countries by Export Orientation 
Manufacturing (>20% share of exports) (18): 
Algeria, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia 
and Zimbabwe. 
Agriculture (>20% share of exports) (10): 
Benin, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Tanzania, Togo 
and Uganda. 
Mining/Resources (>20% share of exports) (7): 
Angola, Central African Republic, Guinea, Mauritania, Niger, Togo and Zambia. 
Oil Exporters (6): 




APPENDIX Table A: Average Tariffs by Country 
 
    AVERAGE ANNUAL TARIFFS 
Country    1980-85  1990-95  2000-02 
Algeria      29.6  23.9  19.2 
Benin      48.3  41.0  12.0 
Burkina Faso      21.0  12.0 
Burundi      37.9  7.4   
Cameroon      28.3  18.6  18.0 
Central African Republic    18.6  18.0 
Congo, Rep.      20.6  18.0 
Cote d'Ivoire    27.7  22.9  12.0 
Egypt, Arab Rep.    47.4  32.9  19.9 
Ethiopia      29.0  22.6  18.8 
Gabon        18.6  17.9 
Ghana      33.3  16.7  14.6 
Guinea      76.4  11.9   
Kenya      41.0  33.3  17.1 
Malawi      19.4  19.1  13.4 
Mauritania      24.6  28.2  10.9 
Mauritius      36.2  29.0  19.0 
Morocco      37.5  24.3   
Nigeria      33.8  33.7  30.0 
Rwanda        38.4  9.9 
Senegal        13.3  12.0 
Sierra Leone    25.8  30.3   
South Africa    29.0  9.6  5.8 
Tanzania      23.9  28.4  16.3 
Togo        15.0  12.0 
Tunisia      26.3  27.9  33.9 
Uganda        17.1  9.0 
Zambia        25.5  14.0 
Zimbabwe      10.0  16.7  18.3 
Average      32.8  23.2  16.1 
 
Source: Compiled from various WTO sources. 
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APPENDIX Table B: Trade Shares by Country 
Country  IMPORTS  (% of GDP)  EXPORTS (% of GDP)  TRADE (% of GDP) 
  90-92  98-00  Change  90-92  98-00  Change  90-92  98-00  Change 
Algeria  24.1  23.6  -2.3  26.0  31.0  19.5  50.1  54.6  9.0 
Angola  39.6  81.4  105.6  46.0  77.9  69.3  85.6  159.2  86.1 
Benin  27.7  28.9  4.6  14.9  16.5  10.8  42.5  45.4  6.8 
Botswana  45.9  33.4  -27.2  52.3  31.2  -40.3  98.2  64.6  -34.2 
Burkina Faso  25.5  30.4  19.3  11.6  12.3  5.6  37.1  42.7  15.0 
Burundi  28.4  20.6  -27.5  8.8  8.6  -2.3  37.2  29.2  -21.5 
Cameroon  16.8  25.5  52.2  20.2  27.2  34.4  37.0  52.7  42.5 
Cape Verde  44.7  58.2  30.4  11.5  21.0  81.9  56.2  79.2  41.0 
C African Rep.  24.7  18.6  -24.6  12.9  13.7  6.1  37.6  32.3  -14.1 
Chad  26.1  31.5  20.8  12.2  17.0  39.3  38.2  48.4  26.6 
Comoros  39.1  34.5  -4.6  17.4  23.8  6.4  56.5  58.3  1.8 
Congo, Rep.  44.3  57.8  30.5  47.2  71.9  52.4  91.5  129.7  41.8 
Cote d'Ivoire  27.4  37.8  37.8  31.2  44.2  41.7  58.6  82.0  39.9 
Egypt  33.4  24.3  -27.4  25.6  15.8  -38.2  59.1  40.1  -32.1 
Equatorial Guinea  61.2  105.1  71.8  27.4  96.8  252.8  88.7  202.0  127.8 
Eritrea  56.7  88.6  31.9  20.1  13.9  -6.2  76.8  102.5  25.7 
Ethiopia  12.0  28.3  135.8  6.0  15.1  151.7  18.0  43.4  141.1 
Gabon  32.6  39.1  19.8  46.5  42.7  -8.2  79.1  81.8  3.4 
Gambia, The  74.1  62.8  -15.3  62.2  48.3  -22.3  136.3  111.1  -18.5 
Ghana  26.7  55.2  106.6  17.0  38.3  125.1  43.7  93.5  113.8 
Guinea  26.5  27.6  4.2  24.4  22.9  -6.2  50.9  50.5  -0.8 
Guinea-Bissau  41.6  45.7  9.7  8.3  23.7  186.5  49.9  69.4  39.0 
Kenya  28.9  33.2  14.7  26.8  25.6  -4.4  55.7  58.8  5.5 
Lesotho  124.3  96.8  -22.1  17.0  26.4  54.9  141.3  123.2  -12.8 
Madagascar  25.7  32.3  25.4  17.0  23.6  38.7  42.7  55.9  30.7 
Malawi  35.1  40.4  15.4  23.4  28.9  23.2  58.5  69.3  18.5 
Mali  33.7  36.9  9.3  16.9  24.8  46.4  50.7  61.7  21.7 
Mauritania  55.0  53.2  -3.4  42.4  39.9  -5.9  97.5  93.1  -4.5 
Mauritius  67.4  67.8  0.6  62.7  65.2  4.0  130.1  133.0  2.2 
Morocco  31.3  34.4  9.8  25.2  29.7  17.9  56.5  64.1  13.4 
Mozambique  40.4  34.2  -15.3  11.1  12.3  11.3  51.5  46.5  -9.6 
Namibia  55.5  57.0  2.7  47.3  47.4  0.3  102.8  104.4  1.6 
Niger  19.5  24.0  22.8  15.3  16.4  7.3  34.8  40.3  16.0 
Nigeria  33.5  40.1  19.5  41.0  40.9  -0.1  74.5  81.0  8.7 
Rwanda  16.8  23.2  38.3  6.2  6.5  5.0  22.9  29.7  29.4 
Sao Tome e Principe  79.8  79.7  0  18.6  32.6  14.0  98.4  112.3  13.9 
Senegal  30.9  38.8  25.5  24.5  31.3  28.0  55.4  70.1  26.7 
Seychelles  62.8  85.4  22.6  59.0  73.0  14.0  121.8  158.4  36.6 
Sierra Leone  29.0  24.7  -14.7  27.1  15.0  -44.6  56.1  39.7  -29.2 
South Africa  17.8  24.6  38.4  22.7  26.9  18.5  40.5  51.6  27.2 
Swaziland  86.2  89.3  3.6  75.2  72.8  -3.2  161.4  162.1  0.5 
Tanzania  36.8  25.5  -30.8  11.8  13.9  18.3  48.6  39.4  -18.9 
Togo  41.0  47.2  15.2  31.3  33.6  7.4  72.3  80.8  11.8 
Tunisia  47.5  46.1  -2.9  41.2  43.1  4.6  88.6  89.2  0.6 
Uganda  21.9  22.8  4.4  7.8  10.6  35.4  29.7  33.4  12.6 
Zambia  40.6  42.1  3.8  35.6  26.6  -25.3  76.2  68.8  -9.8 
Zimbabwe  28.8  41.7  44.6  24.7  40.8  65.6  53.5  82.5  54.3 






APPENDIX Table C: Transport Costs (cif/fob ratio) 
 
Country  cif/fob ratio  Country  cif/fob ratio 
  1980  1994    1980  1994 
Algeria  1.100  1.100  Mali  1.428  1.429 
Benin  1.205  1.205  Mauritania  1.130  1.130 
Botswana  1.176  1.176  Mauritius  1.210  1.148 
Burkina Faso  1.279  1.282  Morocco  1.136  1.099 
Burundi  1.150  1.150  Mozambique  1.120  1.120 
Cameroon  1.100  1.100  Niger  1.246  1.173 
Cape Verde  1.150  1.150  Nigeria  1.107  1.107 
C African Rep.  1.194  1.089  Rwanda  1.514  1.436 
Chad  1.330  1.350  Senegal  1.144  1.144 
Congo  1.222  1.229  Seychelles  1.150  1.150 
Cote d'Ivoire  1.223  1.244  Sierra Leone  1.099  1.136 
Egypt  1.111  1.111  Somalia  1.149  1.149 
Ethiopia  1.176  1.186  South Africa  1.051  1.087 
Gabon  1.201  1.211  Sudan  1.099  1.066 
Gambia  1.167  1.167  Swaziland  1.006  1.014 
Ghana  1.069  1.069  Tanzania  1.177  1.176 
Kenya  1.149  1.163  Togo  1.217  1.164 
Liberia  1.158  1.155  Tunisia  1.058  1.072 
Libya  1.111  1.111  Uganda  1.111  1.110 
Madagascar  1.244  1.205  Zambia  1.230  1.200 
Malawi  1.138  1.670  Zimbabwe  1.150  1.150 
 
Source: IMF (1995). 
 
 
 